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Nos. 45854-2018 & 45855-2018
Kootenai County Case Nos.
CR-2016-23666 & CR-2017-11646

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Issue
Has Schaeffer failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either when –
upon revoking his probation and executing his underlying sentence of 10 years, with two years
fixed, for felony DUI in case number 45854, and imposing a concurrent unified sentence of 10
years, with three years fixed, for felony DUI in case number 45855 – it declined to retain
jurisdiction; when it imposed a three-year driver’s license suspension in case number 45855; or
when it denied his Rule 35 motion to reduce his sentence in case number 45855?

Schaeffer Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Schaeffer was on probation for his fourth DUI conviction when he “go[t] blacked out
drunk,” drove northbound in southbound lanes of traffic, slid off the shoulder of the road, and
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got stuck in the snow. (PSI, pp.6, 9-10, 12; 1 R., pp.11-12.) Schaeffer lied to officers, claiming
that he was not driving; he performed poorly on field sobriety tests; and his “BrAC was .209 /
.214.” (R., p.12.)
The state charged Schaeffer with felony DUI (two prior DUI convictions within 10
years), with a persistent violator enhancement, in case number 45854. (R., pp.37-39.) Pursuant
to a plea agreement, Schaeffer pled guilty to felony DUI and the state dismissed the persistent
violator enhancement. (R., pp.43-45.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years,
with two years fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed Schaeffer on supervised probation for
three years. (R., pp.57-64.)
Three months later, Schaeffer again consumed alcohol and drove while intoxicated and
while his driver’s license was suspended. (R., p.115.) An officer stopped him for “failing to dim
his vehicle’s bright headlights upon approach of other vehicles” and subsequently found a
“mostly empty beer” on the floorboard of Schaeffer’s vehicle, “within reach of the driver’s seat.”
(R., p.115.) Schaeffer refused to perform field sobriety tests or to submit to breath testing. (R.,
p.115.) A blood draw was “obtained via a search warrant and his BAC was .167.” (1/17/18 Tr.,
p.37, Ls.22-24.)
The state charged Schaeffer with felony DUI (prior felony DUI conviction within 15
years), with a persistent violator enhancement, driving while suspended (second offense), and
open container in case number 45855. (R., pp.139-41.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Schaeffer
pled guilty to felony DUI and the state dismissed the remaining charges and the persistent
violator enhancement. (R., pp.166, 169.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of 10
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “SCHAEFFER,
Jason SC #45854 Sealed.pdf.”
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years, with three years fixed, and ordered that it run concurrently with Schaeffer’s sentence in
case number 45854. (R., pp.180-82.) In case number 45854, Schaeffer’s probation officer filed
a report of violation alleging that Schaeffer had violated the conditions of his probation by
committing the new crime of felony DUI; Schaeffer subsequently admitted the allegation; and
the district court revoked his probation and executed the underlying sentence. (R., pp.66-67, 84,
87-89.) Schaeffer filed a notice of appeal in each case, timely from the district court’s order
revoking probation and executing his underlying sentence in case number 45854, and timely
from the judgment of conviction in case number 45855. (R., pp.92-95, 185-88.) He also filed a
timely Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence in both cases, which the district court denied.
(R., pp.90-91, 183-84; 8/10/18 Tr., p.11, Ls.15-17.)
Schaeffer asserts that the district court abused its discretion “when it executed [his]
sentences,” instead of retaining jurisdiction, in both cases, and when it imposed a three-year
driver’s license suspension in case number 45855, in light of his continued desire for treatment
and his brother’s continuing support.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.2-5.)

Schaeffer has failed to

establish an abuse of discretion.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). Where a
sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a
clear abuse of discretion. McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To
carry this burden the appellant must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of
the facts. Id. A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary
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objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation, or retribution. Id.
The decision whether to retain jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion of the
district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State v.
Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990). The primary purpose of a
district court retaining jurisdiction is to enable the court to obtain additional information
regarding whether the defendant has sufficient rehabilitative potential and is suitable for
probation. State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 677, 115 P.3d 764, 768 (Ct. App. 2005). Probation is
the ultimate goal of retained jurisdiction. Id. There can be no abuse of discretion if the district
court has sufficient evidence before it to conclude that the defendant is not a suitable candidate
for probation. Id.
The maximum driver’s license suspension for felony DUI is five years. I.C. § 188005(6)(d). The district court imposed a driver’s license suspension of only three years, which
falls well within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.180-82.) Furthermore, Schaeffer’s three-year
driver’s license suspension, and the district court’s decision to not retain jurisdiction, were both
reasonable in light of Schaeffer’s failure to rehabilitate and the danger he presents to society due
to his ongoing disregard for the law, his suspended driving privileges, and the conditions of his
probation. (PSI, pp.7-13, 15; R., pp.66, 115.)
On appeal, Schaeffer argues that the district court abused its discretion “by failing to
retain jurisdiction in both cases and by imposing a three-year license suspension” in case number
45855 because he acknowledged his alcohol problem and understood his need for treatment, he
“had taken steps [to] find treatment at the VA” and “was obtaining vocational rehab,” and he had
support from his brother, “who would provide alcohol-free housing.” (Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
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However, Schaeffer was living with his supportive brother in an alcohol-free environment when
he committed the first felony DUI, in case number 45854, and – during his presentence interview
in that case – he acknowledged his alcohol problem and need for treatment, and stated that he
had “learned about benefits the VA has to offer and want[ed] to take advantage of them,”
advising that he was scheduled to attend an inpatient treatment program and planned to “‘go to
barber school’” upon completing treatment. (PSI, pp.13-14, 16-18; 1/17/18 Tr., p.31, Ls.2-3.)
He subsequently completed both “intensive inpatient treatment” and “Individual Counseling” at
the VA (PSI, p.26; R., p.52), and, while on probation in case number 45854, he was again living
with his supportive brother in an alcohol-free environment, he was attending outpatient treatment
at the VA, and he had obtained vocational rehabilitation funding through the VA and was
scheduled to attend barber school (R., p.52; 1/17/18 Tr., p.27, L.22 – p.28, L.23; p.31, Ls.2-3;
p.34, Ls.14-20; p.35, Ls.8-9). Schaeffer nevertheless chose – within just three months of his
placement on probation in case number 45854 – to once again endanger the community by
disregarding his driver’s license suspension and committing what is at least his seventh overall
DUI, resulting in his felony DUI conviction in case number 45855. (R., pp.66, 115, 167-68, 18082; PSI, pp.8-10, 12, 15.) Clearly, the fact that he had already acknowledged his alcohol
problem and need for treatment, participated in both inpatient and outpatient treatment through
the VA, and obtained vocational rehabilitation through the VA to attend barber school, and that
he was continuing to reside with his supportive brother in an alcohol-free environment, did not
preclude Schaeffer from again making the decision to drive while intoxicated. (R., p.52; PSI,
pp.2, 13-14, 16-18, 26; 1/17/18 Tr., p.28, Ls.13-23; p.31, Ls.2-3; p.34, Ls.14-20; p.35, Ls.8-9;
p.45, Ls.19-24.)
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At the combined sentencing and disposition hearing, the state addressed the seriousness
of the offenses, Schaeffer’s ongoing criminal offending, his disregard for the terms of probation,
the danger he presents to the community, and his failure to rehabilitate or be deterred despite
prior treatment opportunities and legal sanctions. (1/17/18 Tr., p.36, L.3 – p.40, L.7 (Appendix
A).) The district court subsequently articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its
decision and also set forth its reasons for imposing Schaeffer’s sentence and three-year driver’s
license suspension in case number 45855, for revoking probation and executing his underlying
sentence in case number 45854, and for declining to retain jurisdiction in both cases. (1/17/18
Tr., p.46, L.19 – p.50, L.22 (Appendix B).) The state submits that Schaeffer has failed to
establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpts of the
sentencing/disposition hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal.
(Appendices A and B.)
Schaeffer next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35
motion to reduce his sentence in case number 45855 in light of his participation in programs
while incarcerated, lack of disciplinary issues, and desire to help provide for his daughter.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-6.) There are two reasons why Schaeffer’s argument fails.

First,

Schaeffer’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence was not timely ruled upon. Second, even
if this Court reviews the merits of Schaeffer’s claims, he has failed to establish an abuse of
discretion.
The district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Schaeffer’s Rule 35 motion. Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 provides both that a district court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after
judgment and that a motion for reduction may be made within 120 days after judgment. The
Idaho Supreme Court has held that a trial court has jurisdiction to rule on a Rule 35 motion
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within a “reasonable time” after the expiration of the 120 days. State v. Chapman, 121 Idaho
351, 352, 825 P.2d 74, 75 (1992). If, however, the trial court fails to rule upon the motion
“within a reasonable time after the expiration of the 120-day period, the trial court loses
jurisdiction.” Id. In addition, it is the movant’s responsibility to “precipitate action on a Rule 35
motion within a reasonable time frame, or otherwise provide an adequate record and justification
for the delay, to avoid the risk of the trial court losing jurisdiction.” Chapman, 121 Idaho at 354,
825 P.2d at 77; see
also ---------State v. Payan, 132 Idaho 614, 619, 977 P.2d 228, 233 (Ct. App. 1998)
- --(citing State v. Day, 131 Idaho 184, 186, 953 P.2d 624, 626 (Ct. App. 1998)); State v. Simpson,
131 Idaho 196, 197 n.2, 953 P.2d 636, 637 n.2 (Ct. App. 1998).
The district court entered its judgment of conviction in case number 45855 on January
18, 2018, and Schaeffer filed his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence 13 days later, on
January 31, 2018. (R., pp.180, 183.) The district court had a “reasonable time” (more than six
months) to rule on the motion; however, it did not do so until August 10, 2018 – 204 days after
the entry of judgment and 191 days after the motion was filed. (8/10/18 Tr., p.11, Ls.15-17.)
Nothing in the record justifies such a lengthy delay. Although the register of actions indicates
that, on February 1, 2018, a Rule 35 hearing was scheduled for August 10, 2018, the record
contains no explanation as to why the hearing could not have been scheduled for an earlier date,
as August 10th was more than six months after the motion was filed, and nearly three months
beyond the 120-day limitation for ruling on the motion. (R., p.112.) Because nothing in the
record shows a reason for the delay, the court had no jurisdiction, 204 days after the entry of
judgment and 191 days after the motion was filed, to rule on the motion. The district court’s
order denying Schaeffer’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence should be affirmed because
the court lost jurisdiction, due to the passage of time, to grant the motion.
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Even if Schaeffer’s motion was considered timely ruled upon, he has still failed to
establish an abuse of discretion. If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for
reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of
the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840
(2007). To prevail on appeal, Schaeffer must “show that the sentence is excessive in light of
new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule
35 motion.” Id. Schaeffer has failed to satisfy his burden.
On appeal, Schaeffer argues that the district court should have granted his Rule 35
request for a one-year reduction of his fixed time in case number 45855 because he participated
in programs and did not have disciplinary issues while incarcerated, and because “his daughter
had been living with her grandmother,” who “had knee problems and could not work and
therefore needed help taking care of his daughter, and he wished to help her.” (Appellant’s brief,
pp.5-6.) This was not “new” information, as acceptable behavior is no less than what is expected
of inmates committed to the Department of Correction, and the district court was aware, at the
time of sentencing in case number 45855, that Schaeffer wished to participate in programming
provided by the Idaho Department of Correction, that he and his daughter’s grandmother “share
in the care of his daughter,” and that his daughter’s grandmother was caring for his daughter
while he was in custody. (PSI, p.14; 1/17/18 Tr., p.32, Ls.6-8; p.43, Ls.2-14; p.45, Ls.2-4.)
Although Schaeffer changed his story, at the hearing on his Rule 35 motion, and claimed
that he has been his daughter’s “sole provider” since 2012 and that his daughter’s grandmother
needed his help because she “is on disability” and “there’s no -- no income really in the house
whatsoever” (8/10/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.13-20), he did not provide any information from his daughter’s
grandmother to verify these claims. Moreover, Schaeffer’s claim that he has been his daughter’s
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“sole provider” since 2012 is doubtful – as is his willingness and/or ability to provide for her
upon his release – as he has been in and out of jail and inpatient treatment programs since his
daughter’s birth (particularly since 2015); he did not report any expenses related to caring for a
child either at the time of his presentence interview in case number 45854 or after he committed
the second felony DUI, in case number 45855; he was not employed at any time after he
committed the first felony DUI in these cases (in 2016), even while he was on probation, despite
reporting that his past employer “was willing to allow him to return”; and he did not indicate that
he has any plans for employment in the near future, instead speaking only of participating in
additional inpatient treatment programs and attending barber school. (PSI, pp.2, 10-15, 17-18,
26; R., pp.129-30; 1/17/18 Tr., p.32, Ls.6-14; p.34, Ls.12-17; p.41, Ls.1-9; p.44, Ls.21-23; p.45,
Ls.19-24; -see 8/10/18 Tr., p.5, L.3 – p.8, L.2.) Also, as Schaeffer’s counsel pointed out at the
Rule 35 hearing, Schaeffer’s request to reduce the fixed portion of his sentence in case number
45855 from three years to two years would still have left him with approximately 11 months of
fixed time to serve, which would not have been of much assistance to his daughter’s
grandmother if her household truly had “no income … whatsoever.” (8/10/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.15-16;
p.9, Ls.5-8.) Even if it was, Schaeffer’s purported desire to provide for his daughter does not
outweigh the danger he presents to the community due to his repeated and ongoing decisions to
drive while intoxicated.
At the hearing on Schaeffer’s Rule 35 motion, the state opposed Schaeffer’s request for a
reduction of sentence, stating, “The defendant was on probation for a felony DUI, committed a
new felony DUI. I appreciate that he’s trying to get treatment now, but I think for the protection
of society the Court did hand down an appropriate sentence.” (8/10/18 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-8.) The
district court subsequently articulated its reasons for denying Schaeffer’s Rule 35 motion for a
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reduction of sentence. (8/10/18 Tr., p.10, L.14 – p.11, L.17 (Appendix C).) The state submits
that Schaeffer has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for the reasons set forth above and
for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the Rule 35 hearing transcript, which
the state adopts as its argument on appeal. (Appendix C.)

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order revoking
Schaeffer’s probation and executing his underlying sentence in case number 45854, Schaeffer’s
conviction and sentence and three-year driver’s license suspension in case number 45855, and
the district court’s orders denying Schaeffer’s Rule 35 motions in both cases.

DATED this 1st day of April, 2019.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming _____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1st day of April, 2019, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.
__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

1

THE DEFENDANT: So the only guy that keeps me

2
3
4
5
6
7

out of trouble for sure was gone and, I don't know, just
depression. And I haven't had any counseling, which I
probably should, and that's what I'll be working on.
1HE COURT: Where were you living?
1HE DEFENDANT: In Athol.
THE COURT: What was the situation? Who were

8

you living with?
1HE DEFENDANT: Oh, I was living with my
nephews and my daughter and our mom that was helping

9
10

1
2
3

4
5
6
7
8

9

driving?
THE DEFENDANT: I have no Idea, really. To
Coeur d'Alene. No destination.
THE COURT: Had you been living at this

11

12

watch his two boys.
THE COURT: So how did you start drinking that

12

location since you got placed out on probation?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Was there -- did you have a job

13
14
15
16
17

day? Where?
1HE DEFENDANT: Where?
1HE COURT: Uh-huh. And under what
circumstances? How did that come about?
THE DEFENDANT: That I pretty much just left.

13
14
15

eventually?
THE DEFENDANT: I was headed -- on
September 29th I was headed to Paul Mitchell's School of

18
19

I went down to my buddy's hous~ which is, like, around

16
17
18

Barber and I was just waiting around until then. I had
already received funding through the VA to do that.
THE COURT: When did you get accepted at that

the corner. They were barbecuing and then they were

19

schooling? About.

20

drinking, and then just left from there and I went back
to the house and then drove.
1HE COURT: Did you drive to your buddy's
house?
1HE DEFENDANT: No, I didn't.
THE COURT: So whose car were you driving when

20
21
22

THE DEFENDANT: Like in June.
THE COURT: So why not work -- do something in
the summertime? Lots of people work a summer job before

23
24
25

they start school in September? Why not do that?
THE DEFENDANT: I should have done that. I
mean, I had some applications -- my mom had driven me

11

21

22
23
24
25

10

you drove?
1HE DEFENDANT: I took my brother's car.
1HE COURT: Your license is suspended?
1HE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Where were you going when you were

34

33

1
2
3

around Athol, but I didn't get any call backs in the
short period I was out; three months, I think.
THE COURT: Had you met with your probation

1

State's recommendation with regard to the sentencing and

2
3

4
5
6

officer?

4

1HE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Were you doing urinalysis? The
random UAs in place?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I was doing them at the

5
6
7

the dispositions.
MR. MORTENSEN: Thank you.
Your Honor, in the new case, the 2017-11646
case, I am asking for a 10-year unified sentence;
specifically, a five plus five. I will be asking for a
$200 reimbursement to the state lab. This was a blood

8

draw.

VA and doing outpatient.
THE COURT: How were you getting to t he VA?
THE DEFENDANT: A buddy he was -- lived close

9
10

Your Honor, I am going to ask for imposition
of that prison sentence. I'm asking for prison; not
probation not a rider. I'll ask the Court to impose the
sentences in the probation matters as wel~ and I don't
oppose concurrent sentences.
Your Honor, in support of my recommendation, I

7
8
9
10
11
12

13
14
15
16
17

to Athol. He was a veteran too and he picked me up.
1HE COURT: All right. Was all the drinking
that day done at your friend's house at the barbecue?
1HE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
THE COURT: So who was back at the house you

19

were living at when you went there from your friend's
and took your brother's car?
THE DEFENDANT: Nobody. My mom was gone with

20
21

my nephews.
THE COURT: All right. All right. Thank you.

22
23
24
25

Anything else you would like to say? I asked you a lot
of questions there.
THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Well, I'll hear the

18

11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

do want to discuss the defendant's criminal history. As
the Court knows there was no PSI in this case. We do
have a PSI in this probation case, but just so the
record's dear.
The defendant -- he already went on a rider
once. Granted it was about 15 years ago. He was
convicted in Bonner county of felony assault or battery
on a law enforcement officer and he went on a rider in
t hat case.
In 2004, a conviction for false info to law
enforcement out of Bonner county. 2007 felony

36

35
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1
2

3

aggravated assault conviction out of Bonner county. I
see that he's had some probation violations since then.

1

a defendant won't benefit from treatment. However, we

2

have to balance his need for treatment and the timing of

3

this treatment with the need to protect society.

2011 he got a DUI in Kootenai County. 2015
resisting/obstructing and misdemeanor possession out of

4

It's my understanding that most Inmates In

Bonner county. 2015, battery and disturbing the peace

5

prison before they face the parole board, go through

out of Bonner county.
And then he got the 2015 conviction for felony

8

aggravated assault out of Bonner county. That's one of

6
7
8

rehabilitation and/or treatment, whatever we want to

7

the defendant's going to get treatment. It's really a

9

the probation cases. A misdemeanor in 2016, DUI in
Bonner county. And then the 2017 conviction for felony

9

matter of when.

10

10

11

DUI in Kootenai county and that's one of the probation

11

12

cases before your Honor.

12

the wrong thing to do. It would be putting the public
at risk. We see what he's done and without getting him

history. This is his fourth lifetime DUI conviction.

13
14

treatment, he's too big of a risk just to reenter
society. And so I'm not going to spend much more time

He was on probation for DUI while he committed this

15

arguing against probation.

offense. And the facts of this case are that he did not

16
17

4
5
6

13
14
15
16
17

And as you can see, the defendant has a

call It. And so I don't think there's any question that

I'm arguing that if he's on probation, it's

Really, I think we need to decide if this Is
better for a rider or for prison. Your Honor, if he
goes on a rider, the Court knows very well that he'll be

18

dim his headlights. He was pulled over. He was
suspected he was DUL He refused FSTs and he refused a

19

breath sample. And that's concerning to the State, your

19

back in under a year and we'll be sitting here

20

Honor, because not only is he on probation breaking the

20

considering whether it's prison or probation.

21

law and driving intoxicated, but he's not cooperating

21

22

with law enforcement during their investigation. A
blood draw was obtained via a search warrant and his BAC

22

23
24

25

was .167, so we're talking about twice the legal limit.
Your Honor, I'll never stand here and say that

18

I'm arguing that even if he gets treatment,
which he needs, to have him back in society In a year or

23

less is way too soon. Given his history, given the

24

facts of this case, and the facts that he -- the fact

25

that he's on probation while he's doing this, to have

38

Tl

1
2

him out in the community in under a year is way too soon

1

alcohol, found a car and here we are. And so I just

and not appropriate. He needs to do time.

2

think that given the facts of the case and the

3
4

circumstances behind his prior arrests, he -- I don't

I think the public expects time in a case like

3
4
5

this and that's why I'm asking for time in a case like

6

determinate sentence before he's eligible for parole.

7
8

He'll go through some rehabilitation before he sees the

5
6
7

parole board, and he can be integrated into society if

8

this. I think he needs to do five years of a

think we can put the public at risk in under a year by
putting him on the path to probation, so I'm arguing for
prison, your Honor.
It's with that that I submit. Thank you.

9

the parole commission thinks he is an appropriate risk

9

TI-IE COURT: Thank you. I'll hear the
defense's recommendation including your estimate of time

10

at that time.

10

served leading up to today's sentencing.

If he's paroled, I'm arguing that he needs

11

MR. NAFTZ: Thank you, Judge.
As Jason indicated, Judge, we are going to be

11

12

every year of those five years of the indeterminate

12

13
14

sentence I'm asking for to be supervised. The public

asking that the Court retain jurisdiction in this case.
Mr. Mortensen correctly pointed out that Jason did go on

15

needs to know that he's going to prison for the full ten

13
14
15

16

years.

16

agree that the rider program has significantly changed
over the years and, arguably, improved over the years

needs him to be supervised, and if he violates again he

Your Honor, this is the only way I know to

a rider back in 2003, but I think the Court also would

17
18

ensure that society will be protected. It's the only

17
18

19

way to ensure that he's not going to drink and as good

19

too. To now where if the Court did retain jurisdiction
that Jason would benefit from the programming he would

20
21

intentions as his brother may have, he said it himself,

20

receive down there.

he can't guarantee a hundred percent of the time that

21

So that's part of the basis why we're asking

22

the defendant's not going to drink or get behind the

22

23

wheel.

24

25

And that's exactly what happened this last
time. His brother was away and the defendant found

23

for it. It has been a significant amount of time.
We're asking that the Court allow him to take advantage

24

of that programming down there and ultimately benefit

25

from it.
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1

MR. MORTENSEN: Your Honor, I do have more

2
4
5

information about that 2007 conviction if the Court
requires it.
THE COURT: Please.
MR. MORTENSEN: It's a 2006-4901 case number

6
7
8
9
10

out of Bonner county. It looks like the disposition
date was May 7th of 2007. And it was amended to
aggravated assault.
THE COURT: From an aggravated battery?
MR. MORTENSEN: No, It was amended from a lewd
conduct with a child under 16.
THE COURT: All right. See 1 have that listed

4
5
6
7

ago. My drinking's really gone downhill.
THE COURT: Who"s watching the child while
you're in custody here?
THE DEFENDANT: My daughter's grandma
THE COURT: Okay. Were you convicted of
aggravated assault in 2007?
ll-lE DEFENDANT: It was an Alford plea, yes. I

8
9

have two aggravated assaults.
THE COURT: All right. Maybe just got by the

10
11

PSI.
THE DEFENDANT: Just alcohol. 1 don't want it

11

12

12

16
17
18
19

in my life no more. It's -- and I do believe I could
benefit from a rider program. 1 know my brother he was
a C.O. at Cottonwood for many years And I don't want
to drink no more. If there was like a bracelet I could
put on, or any -- I heard about some kind of drug that
makes you sick or Antabuse or something like that, I'd
like get in a program like that.
THE COURT: When you got sentenced.and placed

20
21

on probation In April of 2017, I just have a question
mark here whether you have done - had done residential

22
23
24

treatment and Inpatient treatment before that through
the VA?
THE WITNESS: Yeah, up until I got a bed date.

1
2
3

13
14

15

25

THE COURT: All right.

3

13
14

as 2002.

15
16
17
18
19

date is the date of the charge, but then I see an
August 2006 date where it says "New case filed." And
I'm reading from the repository right now and so, you
know, I don't know any more details than that.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you for that.
Well, Mr. Schaeffer, having accepted your
guilty plea to the offense of felony DUI in case
17-11646 and having accepted your -- or the record
showing that you admitted the probation violation in the
report dated July 17 of 2017, that violation being this
new DUI. It's the judgment of t he Court that you're

20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. MORTENSEN: And I see that July 1st, 2002,

46

45

1
2
3
4

s
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25

guilty of the new felony DUI and that you are in
violation of your probation.
I have four factors of sentencing in mind that
I'm required to think about. Those factors being the
best way to protect society with a sentence. How to
deter you from this kind of conduct but also how to
deter other individuals in similar situations from such
conduct. I have to think about the punishment that
society expects under these circumstances, and I need to
think about how to best help rehabilitation that a
sentence and a probation violation disposition can help.
I do have all of those (actors in mind and I
do give you credit for 201 days served leading up to
today's sentencing in the new case.
This Is a significant criminal history. It
goes back into your juvenile years. You had battery -an Informal disposition of a battery when you were 16.
A grand theft by receiving stolen property when you were
16 as well. A burglary when you were 16. When you go
into the Army at age 19 and two years with a general
discharge. I think there was a DUI in the army while
you were there.
And then this 2002 matter that may have
resulted in a conviction in 2007. Battery on a law
enforcement officer also in 2002. That was the rider

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24

25

that was referred to. More alcohol problems, DUI, in
2003.
Another one in 2004 with false information to
law enforcement officer. Another DUI in 2010. The
resisting in 2015. Some batteries and then you were
charged with aggravated battery and there was a DUI in
there as well. That was amended to the aggravated
assault. It was a significant injury on a woman; bloody
nose and all when the police showed up. I think an
unlawful entry was a conviction there too. And a
habitual part 2 -- a part 2 habitual offender.
In that case you were placed on probationfor
three years. The judgment -- or sentence was a
five-year sentence; two fixed followed by three
Indeterminate. You were placed on a three-year
probation November the 24th, 2015. That was violated
with a DUI in 2017, but you were reinstated back out on
to probation and that probation was extended out to
November of 2019.
You got this felony DUI in Kootenai County for
which the sentence was ten years; two fixed followed by
eight indeterminate. Placed on probation on April
the 3rd, 2017. And then, of course, the new DUI on
July 1 of 2017 under the circumstances that have been
described here today.
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1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

13
14
15

16
17
18

19
20
21

22

This is a situation where the overriding
concern for the Court is the protection of society. I'm
satisfied that the State's made an adequate
recommendation; I'm not going to completely follow the
recommendation. But this is not a situation where we
can look to just give you a little more treatment at
Cottonwood and then try it back out on probation. This
is a significantly serious probation violation that I
just can't consider you for probation unless there's
some time spent here. I just don't think the community
is adequately protected.
So in the new case your unified sentence is
going to be a 10-year sentence. I t will consist of
three years fixed followed by seven years indeterminate.
I'm imposing that sentence. I'm not retaining
jurisdiction or suspending it.
I am going to impose the sentences in the two
probation violation cases. Again, in the Bonner case it
was five years; two fixed, three indeterminate. In the
Kootenai case it was ten years; two fixed, eight
indeterminate. Those sentences ran concurrent with each

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

The rider program is not just a treatment
program. It's also a programming to certainly change
some criminal thinking, but it's also to let the Court
know how you're likely to perform on probation. And I
just got to say without making it sound too mean, your
actions on July 1st informed me how you're likely to
perform on probation. It doesn't make sense tome to
send you down on a rider to give me an evaluation of how

9

you might perform on probation. I put you on probation

10

in April and your actions Informed me of how you were
likely to perform, so that's why I'm using the prison

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

sentence.

21

get out on parole. So for that three-year period you
will have absolutely no driving privileges at all.
Any questions from the State about this
sentence?
MR. MORTENSEN: No, your Honor. Thank you.

22
23

23
24

other and the new sentence runs concurrent with all of
these. So you're going to go down to the main prison
for three years minus 201 days and then you'll be able

24

25

to apply to the parole board for parole.

25

It's not that I don't care about
rehabilitation, I want that to happen, but society has
just got to be protected until that parole board thinks
that It's safe for our community for you to have
rehabilitation out In the community.
I'm going to suspend your driver's license in
the 2017 case. It's an absolute suspension for three
years and that suspension begins from the time that you

50

49

1
2
3
4
5

THE COURT: How about the defense?
MR. NAFTZ: No, thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: I am signing the order that
dismisses the Counts II and III and the part 3 in this
matter, dated this date now. And you're remanded to the

6
7

bailiff to begin the service of this sentence.
With that, you are excused and we are

8
9

adjourned.
(Court adjourned.)

10
11

12

1

2
3
4
5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12

13

13

14
15
16

14
15

16

17

17

18

18
19

19
20
21

STATE OF IDAl;!Qc-,
COUNTY OF

23

22
23

24

24

25

25

,

I, Valerie Nunemacher, a notary public and
duly certified court reporter in and for the State of
Idaho, DO HEREBY CERTIFY:
That the foregoing proceedings was taken on
the date and at the time and place herein stated;
That the foregoing Is a true and correct
transcription, to the best of my ability, of my
shorthand notes taken down at said time and place In the

above-entitled litigation;
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not related to any of
the parties or attorneys to this litigation and have no
interest in the outcome of said litigation.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
hand this 11th day of May, 2018.

20
21

22

~

KcidfENA'f')°RTER S CERTIFICATE

<)4 l 0u.,', t1 ,•aa M!& ,, ,
VALERIE NUNEMACHER, RPR, CSR 738
Court Reporter
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10

1

opposed to any sort of modification.

I think the court was

2

aware of the underlying facts, and the court prepares very

3

well for these sentencings and dispositions and aware of the

4

criminal -- defendant ' s criminal history.

5

on probation for a felony DUI, committed a new felony DUI.

6

I appreciate that he's trying to get treatment now , but I

7

think for the protection of society the Court did hand down

8

a n appropriate sentence.

9

it.

The defendant was

we'd ask the court not to modify

10

Thank you.

11

THE COURT:

Any else, Mr. Naftz?

12

MR. NAFTZ:

Nothing further, Your Honor.

13

Thank you.

14

THE COURT :

15

well, Mr . Schaeffer, the -- when the court

All right.

Thank you .

16

analyzes a motion for a reduction of sentence, that's a

17

discretionary act for the court.

18

factors of sentencing in mind, and the first and the

19

foremost being protecting society the best way we can.

But

20

I also thi nk about deterring you and deterring others.

I

21

think about the pun i shment that society expects.

22

think about hel ping any rehabi l itation.

23

f actors that I considered in your cases as well.

24

think the State has addressed it just the way the court

25

thought about it too.

And I still have the four

And I

And those were the
And I

The 2016 conviction for felony DUI,
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11

1

the Court fashioned a ten- year sentence, two fixed, followed

2

by eight indeterminate.

3

DUI in 2017 , you know, the price just rachets it up a little

4

bit.

5

And then when you get a new felony

The punishment goes up a littl e bit .
I recall that the State asked for a ten- year

6

sentence, but they wanted five years of that fixed .

7

defense wanted a retained jurisdicti on .

8

of chose a middle road there of the ten years but with three

9

fixed, followed by seven indeterminate, runni ng it

10
11

The

And the court sort

concurrentl y with all the cases.
I am happy to hear that you're doing well in the

12

programming that you're working on.

13

that's going to hel p you make a good presentation to the

14

parole board.

15

mind justifies a reduction in this sentence .

16

therefore, the defendant's motion for a reduced sentence

17

under Rul e 35 is denied.

18
19

And that's good, and

But the court has heard nothing that in its
And so,

And will the State please present an order to the
court consistent with the court ' s ruling.
BROOKS:

Yes.

20

MR.

21

THE COURT:

Any questions, Mr . Naftz?

22

MR. NAFTZ :

No questions, Your Honor.

23

THE COURT:

Mr. Brooks?

24

MR. BROOKS:

25

THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.
Mr. Schaeffer, do you have any
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